### 2ac pink tide

#### Chavez’s death fractures the Pink Tide movement- there’s no successor

**O’Reilly, 13**– cites multiple professors (Andrew, “Hugo Chavez’s Death Leaves a Void in Latin America’s Left”, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/03/07/hugo-chavez-leaves-dearth-in-latin-america-left/>)//NG

As the flag-draped coffin of Hugo Chávez was carried through the streets of Caracas on Wednesday, it was not only Venezuelans mourning the loss of the firebrand former president.

For 14 years, Chávez cultivated a cult of personality and a loyal band of followers throughout Latin America due in equal to his fiery rhetoric and his generous oil subsidies. His death has left a dearth in the leadership of Latin America’s radical Left and given rise to questions about who will fill that role.

“Chávez was an outsized personality and he had the ambitions to spearhead his own Bolivarian revolution,” said Eric Hershberg, the director of Latin American Studies at American University. “There is not an obviously clear successor to take on that role.”

Thanks in part to his regional body named the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), Chávez built a close coalition of regional leaders that were sympathetic to his socialist views, including Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and Bolivia’s Evo Morales. Venezuelan oil subsidies also helped secure the allegiances of Cold War stalwarts such Cuba’s Castro brothers and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.

Now with Chávez death, the left-leaning answer to the U.S.-backed Organization of American States has to find a new figurehead to lead the alliance.

Some also think that the movement toward a more red left will die off with the former Venezuelan leader. Chávez helped usher in the aptly named new wave of Latin American socialism and gave the institutional precedent for leaders like Correa and Morales to come to power.

The Pink Tide of last decade, which saw the ascent of a number of left leaning leaders in the last 15 years, from Chávez to former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, could edge from the more radical side to a more moderate one now that Chávez is dead.

“Latin America’s move to the left is not completed,” said George Ciccariello-Maher, an expert in Venezuelan politics at Drexel University in Philadelphia. “There is definitely not a united left in Latin America.”

Experts almost unanimously agree that a replacement for Chávez is almost impossible, due to both his political savvy and Venezuela’s oil money. But if there was to be someone to pilot Latin America’s radical left it might be Ecuador’s Correa.

A career politician with a similar spirited style and political view to Chávez, Correa recently handily won reelection, has gained popularity for his rampant public spending and gained notoriety on the world stages for clashes with the United States – including his refusal to renew the lease on airbases used by US forces to mount anti-narcotics missions and the 2008 expulsion of two U.S diplomats.

Ecuador is also a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and relies heavily on these exports. While the country’s exports pale in comparison to Venezuela's – 334 barrels per day compared to Venezuela’s 1,553 – Correa has aggressively pushed for new contracts with foreign companies to share the income that goes to the state.

Correa also fashions his public image after Chávez, using his weekly radio and TV shows to attack enemies and push his agenda, while suppressing free press.

“Correa is ideologically very similar to Chávez and one could view him as the successor, but nobody can follow Chávez,” said Shannon O’Neill, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. “There is no other leader that has both the ideology and economic backing that he had.”

Much has been made of Chávez’s working class background and his rise to power, which is in opposition to many of Latin America’s leaders – Correa included – who come from more landed backgrounds. The former Venezuelan’s so-called authenticity may be surpassed only by Bolivia’s Morales.

A former coca farmer, Morales came to power in 2006 and rode a wave of popular support to become Latin America’s first indigenous leader. Demure, pudgy and almost always dressed in his trademark sweater, Morales is an avowed socialist and a champion of Bolivia’s indigenous majority.

As one of Chávez’s closest allies, Morales seized control of Bolivia’s affluent gas fields and put them under state control soon after his election. Other changes implemented during Morales’ first term were a constitutional reform that gave more regional and local autonomy and redefined Bolivia as a plur-national nation.

Much as Chávez ran into opposition from Venezuela’s conservative factions and business leaders, Morales ran into problems with leaders from Bolivia’s wealthy eastern province of Santa Cruz, who argued his polices damaged the economy and threatened private property.

His support of the coca growers has also put him at odds with the U.S., who wants to eradicate the crop that is the base substance in the production of cocaine.

While Morales has made a name for himself inside Bolivia and in certain parts of the world, he seems be content with his work in his homeland and has not shown intentions of taking up the mantle left by Chávez’s passing.

“I don’t see any effort by Morales to project himself as a leader beyond Bolivia,” Hershberg said, adding that unlike Correa, Morales seems content with his place as a world leader.

Some experts, however, believe that Morales’ background and ability to relate to Latin America’s poor would set him up as an ideal successor to Chávez’s title as leader of Latin America’s left.

“Morales can relate to social and indigenous movements in the same way that Chávez could,” said George Ciccariello-Maher, an expert in Venezuelan politics at Drexel University in Philadelphia. “Correa has a much more difficult time with social movements.”

Chávez’s chosen successor in Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, is seen by experts as a long shot to take over his role on the global stage. His lack of charisma, inability to appeal to every facet of Venezuela’s socialist party like Chávez did and apparent lack of experience – as evidenced by his jumbled handling of Chávez’s death – all play against him.

“Maduro doesn’t have the personality,” said Susan Purcell of the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami of the former bus driver-turned-political leader. “His crazy speech the day Chávez died shows he was trying to pick up his mantle of anti-U.S. rhetoric and it didn’t work.”

#### Cuba can’t fill in for Venezuela

**Johnson, et al, 10** – Andy Johnson is a director in the national security program at The Third Way (“End the Embargo of Cuba”, The National Security Program, 9/6/10, [http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third\_Way\_Memo\_-\_End\_the\_Embargo\_of\_Cuba.pdf)//EX](http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf%29//EX)

Peter Brookes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense under George W. Bush, said that lifting the embargo could lead to Cuba becoming a regional power, arguing that the US “[doesn’t] need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean—or beyond.”14 While Venezuela, for example, has challenged the US on some interests, its anti-American leadership has not been able to present a serious counterweight to the US or have a significant impact on US security. Given that Venezuela is a much bigger economic player than Cuba due to its oil revenues, it is highly unlikely that Cuba would pose a significant geopolitical challenge to the US, even if significant sums of money enter Cuba’s economy.

### 2ac appeasement

**Non-unique—Obama appeasing Cuba now**

**Diaz-Balart ‘12** (Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart represents the 21st congressional district in South Florida; August 21, 2012; “Mario Diaz-Balart: Obama has Pursued Policy Appeasement”; Fox News Latino; http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/21/mario-diaz-balart-obama-has-pursued-policy-appeasement-toward-castro-regime/)

These compliments – and the fact that they were not disavowed by the White House – come as no surprise, given President Obama’s appeasing stance regarding anti-American totalitarian regimes. Since he took office in January 2009, President Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement toward the totalitarian Cuban dictatorship. Despite the Castro brothers’ harboring of international terrorists and their increasingly relentless oppression of the Cuban people, President Obama weakened U.S. sanctions and has increased the flow of dollars to the dictatorship. In response, the Castro brothers amped up their repression of the Cuban people and imprisoned American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross for the “crime” of taking humanitarian aide to Cuba’s small Jewish community. Clearly, President Obama is not concerned about the threat posed by the Cuban dictatorship, nor has he manifested genuine solidarity with the pro-democracy aspirations of the Cuban people. - U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. The Cuban people are protesting in the streets and demanding freedom. But rather than supporting the growing, courageous pro-democracy movement, President Obama instead has chosen to appease their oppressors. While President Obama claims that his policies aim to assist the oppressed Cuban people, his actions betray that he is not on their side. You cannot credibly claim to care about the oppressed while working out side deals with their oppressors and welcoming the oppressors’ elite into the United States with open arms. And you cannot claim to support political prisoners while increasing the flow of dollars to their jailers. The failures of the Obama administration in Cuba are not an isolated foreign policy failure. Around the world, President Obama has taken an approach of appeasement when it comes to some of our most virulent enemies. In addition to Cuba, from Iran to Syria to Venezuela, President Obama has shown an unwillingness to stand firm when anti-American forces threaten our interests, and his weakness has emboldened America’s enemies. If we are going to reassert our position in the world, we need a change at the top.

#### Turn- lifting the embargo hurts the regime, the money would cycle back into the US’s hands and US influence would spread.

Griswold 9- director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute

(Daniel, “The US Embargo of Cuba Is a Failure” CATO institute, June 15, 2009, [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-embargo-cuba-is-failure)//HA](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-embargo-cuba-is-failure%29//HA)

Advocates of the embargo argue that trading with Cuba will only put dollars into the coffers of the Castro regime. And it’s true that the government in Havana, because it controls the economy, can skim off a large share of the remittances and tourist dollars spent in Cuba. But of course, selling more US products to Cuba would quickly relieve the Castro regime of those same dollars.

If more US tourists were permitted to visit Cuba, and at the same time US exports to Cuba were further liberalised, the US economy could reclaim dollars from the Castro regime as fast as the regime could acquire them. In effect, the exchange would be of agricultural products for tourism services, a kind of “bread for beaches”, “food for fun” trade relationship.

Meanwhile, the increase in Americans visiting Cuba would dramatically increase contact between Cubans and Americans. The unique US-Cuban relationship that flourished before Castro could be renewed, which would increase US influence and potentially hasten the decline of the communist regime.

Congress and President Barack Obama should act now to lift the embargo to allow more travel and farm exports to Cuba. Expanding our freedom to travel to, trade with and invest in Cuba would make Americans better off and would help the Cuban people and speed the day when they can enjoy the freedom they deserve.

#### Easing the embargo makes communism more easy to contain – comparatively better than any possible hit to US cred

Safran 2012 -Master of Science in Global Affairs (with distinction) at New York University

(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, <http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran>, google scholar)//KW

The continuance of the embargo has incited widespread international condemnation of the Untied States. The United Nations General Assembly has consistently denounced the imposition of the embargo almost unanimously on the basis of its illegitimacy and violation of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. (Herrera, 2003, 50) The United States has also recently had to relinquish its seats on the human rights commissions both in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, which many analysts believe to be a form of retribution aimed at the United States in response to its continuation of the Cuban embargo in the midst of its unfathomable and deplorable effects on the Cuban populace. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Many leaders in the international community have expressed their distain for the U.S. embargo through international organizations based on the fact that the United States attempts to impose the sanctions it places on Cuba via “extraterritoriality,” or against the international community, thus clearly violating internationally-accepted standards of national sovereignty and international law (Herrera, 2003, 51). Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.

### 2ac russia impact

#### Debt disputes mean Cuba won’t ally with Russia

**Frank, 13** – economic correspondent for Reuters based in Havana (Marc, “Deal brokered behind Paris Club's back”, March 14, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/cuba-debt-russia-idUSL1N0C592Z20130314)//eek

HAVANA, March 14 (Reuters) - Russia's agreement to settle a debt squabble with Cuba over $25 billion owed the former Soviet Union has caused concern among other Cuban creditors grouped in the Paris Club, Western diplomats said this week.

The accord, signed late last month during a visit by Russian Federation Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, said the parties had come up with a formula to end the dispute and would sign final papers by 2014, although any deal still needs approval from the Duma.

Cuba last reported its foreign debt in 2009 as $19.8 billion. About 50 percent of that was "passive" debt from before it declared a default in the late 1980s, while the rest was accumulated afterward and classified as "active."

The Communist-run island has never included debt to the Soviet Union in its figures, claiming the amount is in overvalued convertible rubles and that the country sustained massive damage from broken contracts when its former benefactor collapsed.

While little information is available about the deal with Russia, Cuba has let other creditors know it is in no condition to pay its old debts, much of which now consists of accumulated service and interest charges.

#### The impact’s inevitable- they’re focusing on brazil

**Smith 9** – Researcher for UK Defence Academy, PhD in Political Science @ Oxford University (Mark A, “Russia & Latin America: Competition in Washington's "Near Abroad"?”, August, International Relations and Security Network, ProQuest)//ID

Overall, this is the context within which Russia’s relations with Latin America should be placed. BRIC means that Russia’s relations with Brazil are potentially of the greatest significance for Moscow in its dealings with Latin America, even though it could be argued that Russia’s relationship with Venezuela is currently the most important bilateral relationship Moscow has with any Latin American state.

Brazil – key BRIC partner.

Brazil is becoming a key focus of Moscow due largely to the fact that the two powers are part of the BRIC formation of states. Russia supports the Brazilian argument that the number of permanent members of the UN Security Council be expanded. In a joint article published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta in October 2008, Sergey Lavrov and Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim described Brazil and Russia as “natural allies”.25

Security Council secretary Nikolay Patrushev had talks in Moscow in November 2008 with the then Brazilian minister of the Extraordinary Ministry of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger. In October Rosatom head Sergey Kiriyenko visited Brazil. During this visit Russia offered to sell Brazil modern technology for the deep exploration and production of uranium, new nuclear power plants and "superconductor technologies" for transmitting energy.26 In February 2008.

Brazilian defence minister Nelson Jobim visited Moscow for talks with his Russian counterpart Anatoly Serdyukov.27 Moscow is obviously interested in possible military-technical cooperation with Brazil. In November 2008 it was reported that Brazil purchased in October twelve Russian Mi-35M helicopters.28 However Brazil is interested in developing its own armaments industry, and may to a certain extent see Russia as a competitor in this field.

There is interest on both sides in developing cooperation in the space and IT sectors. Brazil has cooperated with Ukraine in the space sector, setting up the Alcantara Cyclone Space Centre. The Pivdenmash enterprise in Dnepropetrovsk was to manufacture the Cyclone-4 rocket to launch satellites. However Ukraine’s financial difficulties resulted in production delays. Russia proposed to Brazil that an alternative to Cyclone-4 be developed as its fuel is not environmentally friendly.29

In spring 2008, Russia and Brazil concluded an agreement to develop a series of launch vehicles as part of Brazil’s Cruzeiro do Sul programme. Russia and Brazil will develop a rocket based on the Russian Angara vehicle. The first stage of the Brazilian Gamma, Delta and Epsilon launchers will be powered by a unit based on the RD-191 engine developed for the Angara rocket. Cooperation with Russia is likely to enable the Brazilian space programme to make significant progress.

When he visited Brazil in November 2008, Medvedev discussed the development of energy cooperation with Petrobras. Gazprom is to open a representative office in Brazil in 2009, and Medvedev expressed the hope that the trade turnover would be increased to $10 billion by the end of 2008 (in September 2008 it stood at $6 billion). Medvedev also urged that the structure of trade should change from the exchange of Brazilian raw materials for Russian mineral fertilizer to greater cooperation in high technology sectors. Medvedev spoke of developing a technological alliance with Brazil.30 Lavrov and Amorim spoke in their Rossiyskaya Gazeta article of cooperation in the airplane construction and nano-technology sectors. The Russian leadership may feel that there is greater scope for technological cooperation with a BRIC partner such as Brazil than with major western powers, which Moscow may see as being more likely to try and use technological cooperation as a means of keeping Russia in a subordinate position.

In connection with this planned technological alliance, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Brazilian Vice-President Jose Alencar jointly head a high level commission on cooperation between the two states. There is a joint Russo-Brazilian working group, which operates under the auspices of the Russian Federation Security Council and Brazilian Ministry of Strategic Affairs. This is the first such cooperation organ that Russia has with any Latin American state.31

Medvedev also put much emphasis on Russo-Brazilian cooperation within the framework of the BRIC grouping of states.32 The Russian President also sees Brazil as a key partner of Russia in supporting Moscow’s arguments for a restructuring of the international financial system. The Brazilian leadership, like its Russian counterpart, has been critical of the role played by the West in global financial management that led to the financial crisis of 2008.

### 2ac defense

#### Alt causes oppression and won’t solve- Non-State Cuban resistance deflects attention and boosts structural violence

**Powell 08** – Kathy Powell. Lecturer, PhD Social Anthroplogy – National University of Ireland, Galway. Critique of Anthropology – Vol 28(2) p. 177–197 – Sage Database

The unequivocal ‘the people against the state’ discourses are characterized by a certain overstatement (as in the comments about the cows);again, here the state is homogenized and presented as a totalizing force, and qualifying counter-arguments dismissed, along with the importance of the broader political context. The responsibility for Cuba’s current ills is laid squarely at the door of the state, or of President Castro, while complaints about scarcity and the declining value of state rations reflect an outraged sense of entitlement, indicating the high expectations people have had of the allocative power of the state in the past. They are also, however, somewhat ‘overstated’ as well as contradictoryin regard to street solidarity; the same persons can one day extol its virtues,and the next, with equal conviction, describe street relations as a minefield of mistrust, envidia and self-interest. This uneasy coexistence of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sentiments (see also Fernández, 2000) serves as a reminder that while the ability to ‘invent’ and to ‘resolve’ during the crisis **in Cuba** has certainly been remarkable, the celebration of inventiveness and of resilience needs to be accompanied by some caution.In particular, caution is needed to avoid the misrecognized celebration of ‘the poor generating their own resources’ which characterizes some of the ‘social networks’ approaches to analysing the survival strategies of poorcommunities,17 and which is also redolent of recent enthusiasm for Putnamesque interpretations of ‘social capital’18 as both attribute and outcome of community relations and practices, promoted as central tocommunity development. This places much of the responsibility for development on poor communities themselves, and is particularly likely to do so when valorized as a ‘cultural characteristic’ of cubanidad – as indeed many ordinary Cubans do themselves. These approaches risk overlooking a number of things: first, that efforts to ‘invent’ solutions and resolve problems through informal networks **remain firmly constrained** by the structure, distribution andquality of resources available (see Menjívar, 2000), and that a focus on the poor ‘solving problems on their own’ **may deflect attention** from what people actually need and that they do not have (Bryceson, 2000). It overlooksthe fact that, although informality may present day-to-day solutions, **it remains a problem**; as Centeno points out, however functional it may bein the provision of a ‘safety net’, informality guarantees the reproduction of inequalities and an unprotected workforce who, despite their ‘successes’in evading state control, remain politically disempowered.19 Moreover, of particular significance to the value and practice of solidarity, celebrations of the capacity to invent ar, resolver, luchar overlook the **immense strain** on the very relations which underpin this economy of practices. Tales of thisstrain coexist uneasily alongside tales of the state and of street solidarity.The street economy needs solidarity to function; it depends on relations oftrust, complicity, cooperation and social obligations of reciprocity for theex change of information, favours, swapping and lending of materials, equipment and money, support in the ‘diversion’ of state resources and inthe evasion of state surveillance; it generates sentiments of solidarity‘against the odds’ of the mundane, exhausting difficulties of day-to-daysocial reproduction.

#### No internal link- the plan is a drop in the bucket compared to 200 years of neoliberalism in Latin America

#### Neoliberalism is inevitable and sustainable

**Peck 2**—Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia. Former Honourary Professorial Fellow, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. PhD in Geography. AND—Adam Tickell—Professor of Geography, University of Bristol. PhD (Jamie, Neoliberalizing space, Antipode 34 (3): 380-404, AMiles)

In many respects, it would be tempting to conclude with a Ideological reading of neoliberalism, as if it were somehow locked on a course of increasing vulnerability to crisis. Yet this would be both politically complacent and theoretically erroneous. One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity. To a greater extent than many would have predicted, including ourselves, neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies, to ride—and capitalize upon—the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating, and to erode the foundations upon which generalized or extralocal resistance might be constructed. The transformative potential—and consequent political durability—of neoliberalism has been repeatedly underestimated, and reports of its death correspondingly exaggerated. Although antiglobalization protests have clearly disrupted the functioning of "business as usual" for some sections of the neoliberal elite, the underlying power structures of neoliberalism remain substantially intact. What remains to be seen is how far these acts of resistance, asymmetrical though the power relations clearly are, serve to expose the true character of neoliberalism as a political project. In its own explicit politicization, then, the resistance movement may have the capacity to hold a mirror to the process

### 2ac environment

#### Neolib solves the environment

**Ubben 2** (John R., “Trade Liberalization and Environmental Quality: Opposing Viewpoints, Additional Issues, and the Necessity of Intervention,” 8/26/2, http://business.uni.edu/economics/Themes/ubben.pdf)//acjs

Trade Liberalization Benefits the Environment How might trade liberalization help the environment? Trade liberalization can benefit the environment in a number of ways. Free trade can promote the transfer of genetic material and technology that can improve agricultural development and environmental protection in the form of a reduction in chemical use. Trade liberalization can also help improve the efficiency of resource allocation by removing inefficient prices and subsidies. Trade also encourages environmentally sustainable use. Finally, trade can be argued to be a key factor in the increase in environmental standards and increase the speed with which developing countries reach the environmental stage because it serves to increase income [Brack, 1998, 1, 14]. In the area of biotechnology, the transfer of biological pest controls, such as predator organisms and genetically developed crops resistant to disease and insects, can reduce the dependence on chemicals. In agriculture, the transfer of farming practices such as crop rotation and low till or no till farming, can be instrumental in developing sustainable agriculture practices and reducing soil erosion in lesser-developed countries [Zilberman, 1992, 1145]. Trade liberalization may also serve to break down exchange rate policies that subsidize the importation of chemicals. Hence, free trade could reduce chemical usage and lead to environmental improvement [Antel, 1993, 784]. Trade liberalization can help improve resource allocation by removing inefficient prices. Trade liberalization can improve resource allocation by allowing countries to specialize in the production of goods and services in which they are most efficient. Efficiency allows a country to maximize its output for a given level of resources. It can be argued that the efficient allocation of resources is a step toward environmentally sustainable development [Brack, 1998, 1]. If an allocation is Pareto optimal, than there are no other allocation of resources that could make one group better off without hurting any other group. As long as environmental quality is taken into consideration when resources are allocated, then, in theory, trade that promotes efficiency will benefit the environment. Trade can also serve to increase environmental standards in the manufacturing sector. Companies who produce goods for export face a number of different standards, some higher than others. It is simply easier and more cost effective to produce products to meet the highest standards, so when the company looks to expand into new markets it will have the advantage of already complying with standards regarding the environment, labeling, safety, and many other factors [Brack, 1998, 14]. An increased rate of growth of income caused by trade can help promote environmental quality. Increased income creates potential for investment in environmental protection and may also speed up the transition from purely economic concerns to a balance of environmental and economic growth for developing countries [Antel, 1993, 787]. However, this link is not automatic and policies will need to be implemented to ensure environmental concerns are pursued simultaneously. “Poverty per se is a form of environmental degradation and thus economic well-being is an environmental plus, regardless of its effect on pollution control or environmental protection efforts” [GATT Secretariat, Esty, 1994, 64]. The study performed by Perroni and Wigle (1994) is most often cited for the lack of impact trade restrictions, and therefore trade, have on the environment and the type of intervention most successful in promoting environmental protection. The authors attempted to assess international trade’s relationship to environmental degradation by examining the effects on environmental quality and welfare of the following environmental policies: 1) Business as usual (current environmental protection levels). 2) A move to full global internalization meaning, that the internalization rate for the domestic and international components of environmental externalities is 1 or 100%. 3) Unilateral domestic environmental action by North America, meaning that the internalization rate for the domestic component of environmental externalities was 1 or 100% in North America. The authors also examined three trade-policy scenarios: 1) benchmark trade barriers; 2) a removal of all trade barriers (free trade); 3) a three-fold increase in trade barriers (trade wars). Environmental damage was measured locally in terms of emissions summed for all sectors in a region, and globally by summing all sectors in all regions. “The relationship between emissions experienced and environmental damage is modeled by means of convex, constant elasticity damage function: D L (EL ) = kL (EL ) pl Where D = environmental damage D G (EG ) = kG (EG ) pg E L & EG are the sum of net local and global emissions k L & kG are constants pl & pg represent elasticities of damage with respect to emissions (assumed to be greater than 1)” [Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 552-558]. Environmental quality was then modeled on the consumption side of the economy as the difference between endowments of environmental quality and damage. A utility function described by consumption goods and environmental quality was used to measure individual valuations of environmental quality. Environmental policies were described in the model using emission fees that internalized some or all of the external costs associated with emissions. The revenue from these taxes went to the residents of the country where the emissions took place [Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 552-558]. The primary factors of production and trade were labor and capital, which were modeled as domestically mobile but internationally immobile. In the model, this prevented dirty industries from moving to regions with lower emission taxes. Finally, six goods were chosen, representing both industries having high emission levels and those with low levels, as well as high technology and low technology industries. These goods were also identified by their intensities related to labor, skills, capital, and environmental inputs. Countries were then grouped together by their per capita income level and their environmental quality relative to one another [Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 552-558]. By examining trade in these products, environmental damage caused by their production, and environmental policies crossed against each trade-policy scenario, the researchers drew important conclusions on the relationship between trade and the environment. At the benchmark level of the tradepolicy scenario, international trade had a small adverse affect on environmental quality. The removal of all trade barriers resulted in a slight worsening of environmental quality, while a three-fold increase in trade barriers had only a small positive impact on the environment [Perroni & Wigle, 1994, 561-562]. The welfare effect on different regions tells a much different story. Trade liberalization had the greatest benefit for the U.S., Canada, and other developed countries, while the remaining regions saw small or no gains. However, trade regulations/barriers had a substantial negative effect on welfare for all regions. Other results showed that all regions had more than a 39% improvement in environmental quality when externalities were fully internalized regardless of the trade-policy scenario. On the other hand, environmental quality improvements were never more than 2% when trade barriers were used to address environmental issues. The conclusion is that the trade policies of different regions in the study

#### No impact to the environment

Sagoff, 97 - Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans** one iota."n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well** if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

### 2ac cp

### 2ac condo

#### Condo is a voting issue –

#### a) Skew – condo allows them to arbitrarily kick arguments destroying effective 2ac strategy

#### b) Decision-making – the need to concede is an important skill to understand arg interaction – allowing them to arbitrarily kick positions prevents this skill

#### c) C/I – One condo allows them to pick their best offense before the round and is reciprocal

#### d) Reject the team to deter abuse and rejecting the arg links to all our offense

### 2ac obama cred deficit

#### Doesn’t solve obama cred- only repeal of the embargo gives Obama leverage in international organizations and discussions- can’t solve otherwise because countries won’t respect us- that’s Hinderdael

### 2ac human rights

#### Doesn’t solve our symbolism internal link- embargo repeal bolsters human rights credibility among institutions like the UN- can’t solve without it because other countries will view the US as hypocritical- that’s Burgsdorff

###  2ac russia

#### And, human rights cred is key to limit Russian autocracy

Mendelson 9 (Sarah, Senior Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S.-Russia Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit”, 6-19, http://www.tcf.org/publicat ions/internationalaffairs/US-RussianRelationsandtheDemocracyandRuleofLawDeficit.pdf)

In fact, coping with authoritarian trends in Russia (and elsewhere) will involve **changes in U.S. policies that have, on the surface, nothing to do with Russia**. Bush administration counterterrorism policies that authorized torture, indefinite detention of terrorist suspects, and the rendering of detainees to secret prisons and Guantánamo have had numerous negative unintended con­sequences for U.S. national security, including serving as a recruitment tool for al Qaeda and insurgents in Iraq.4 Less often recognized, these policies also have undercut whatever leverage the United States had, as well as limited the effectiveness of American decision-makers, to push back on authoritarian poli­cies adopted by, among others, the Putin administration. At its worst, American departures from the rule of law may have enabled abuse inside Russia. These departures certainly left human rights defenders isolated.5 Repairing the dam­age to U.S. soft power and reversing the departure from human rights norms that characterized the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies will provide the Obama administration strategic and moral authority and improve the ability of the United States to work with allies. It also can have positive consequences for Obama’s Russia policy. The changes that need to be made in U.S. counterterrorism policies, how­ever politically sensitive, are somewhat more straightforward than the adjust­ments that must be made to respond to the complex issues concerning Russia. The Obama administration must determine how best to engage Russian lead­ers and the population on issues of importance to the United States, given Russia’s poor governance structures, the stark drop in oil prices, Russia’s continued aspirations for great power status, and the rather serious resentment by Russians concerning American dominance and prior policies. The policy puzzle, therefore, is how to do all this without, at the same time, sacrificing our values and undercutting (yet again) U.S. soft power. This report assesses the political dynamics that have shaped Russia’s authoritarian drift, briefly addresses a few of the ways in which they mat­ter for U.S. policy, and suggests several organizing principles to help the Obama administration manage this critical relationship. Possible approaches include working closely with Europe on a joint approach to Russia, accurately anticipating the unintended consequences of U.S. policy in one realm (such as Kosovo) for Russia policy, and embracing the rights of states to choose their Sarah E. Mendelson 5 own security alliances. A final important principle relates to U.S. engagement with Russians beyond the Kremlin. President Obama should speak directly to the Russian people, engaging in a manner that respects their interests and desires, but also reflects the core values of the Obama administration; that is, “reject[s] as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.”6 The Obama administration also should endorse a platform and a process for a renewed dialogue between U.S. and Russian civil society. The View from the Kremlin Two interactive dynamics over the past several years have shaped the dominant approach by the Russian government to the outside world: the United States declined as a world power, and at the same time, the Russian state accumulated massive wealth from high gas and oil prices. Following what many in the Russian elite view as the “humiliation” of the 1990s, by 2008, Russia was no longer a status quo power. Instead, revisionist in nature, Russian authorities focused on the restoration of great power status.7 Fueled by petrodollars, the government tackled this project in numerous ways, including military exer­cises around the globe, soft power projects such as a twenty-four-hour-a-day English language cable news station, “think tanks” in New York and Paris, and perhaps most important, gas and oil distribution systems meant to make Russia a central player in energy security for decades to come.8 This restora­tion project undoubtedly will be slowed by the current financial crisis and drop in oil revenues, but the building blocks remain in place. As the restoration project evolved, the Putin administration increasingly challenged aspects of the post–World War II and post–cold war legal, secu­rity, and economic architecture, and suggested the need for new arrangements. Many in the Russian elite seemed to view the changes that have occurred in Europe over the past twenty years, such as the enlargement of the North 6 U.S.-Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), as ille­gitimate, driven not by the choices of local governments or populations, but by the will of Washington. Nostalgia for the Soviet era, a related sentiment, is widely shared, and is an important source of former president and now Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s popularity.9 Some experts even suggest that many in Russia’s governing structures believe that Europe whole and free—that is, post–cold war Europe—is not in the security interest of Russia. The Carnegie Moscow Center’s Lilya Shevtsova has labeled this view “great power nation­alism” and observes that the “Putin-Medvedev-Lavrov doctrine” derives from the premise that Russia seeks to contain the West—while the West is busy trying not to offend Russia.10 Some other studies suggest that Russian policy­makers have attempted, in fact, to divide the United States from Europe, and generally have preferred bilateral to multilateral engagement.11 At the United Nations, Russia, together with China, repeatedly has challenged international responses to gross human rights violations in Burma, Darfur, and Zimbabwe, and it has engaged in systematic efforts to undermine the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) election monitoring efforts and the Council of Europe’s human rights monitoring.12 Meanwhile, Russian lead­ers seem to believe the current European security arrangements are soft com­mitments, ripe for renegotiation and restructuring. President Dmitri Medvedev has, in fact, called for a new “collective security arrangement,” at the same time reintroducing the concept of spheres of influence.13 All of these actions taken together, along with the decline in U.S. soft power, have looked at times as if some in the Russian government were trying to reset the table on human rights and international law, exporting its democracy and rule of law deficit abroad. How best can the United States, together with Europe, respond to this situation? Two additional dynamics are relevant: Russian internal weaknesses, both political and economic, but also the degree to which the Russian authori­ties’ assessment of the condition of the international system is correct. For Sarah E. Mendelson 7 example, in August 2008, Russian government officials fecklessly deployed human rights and international law rhetoric to justify the Russian use of force in South Ossetia—was that just a murky reflection of the current deeply incon­sistent international order?14 Will that calculation be challenged by the Obama administration? How can it do so effectively? Will we see a new era of more robust international organizations, underpinned by respect for human rights and international law? If not, will we be in for a period of serious instability in Europe, along Russia’s borders? Russia’s Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit What makes these questions so pressing is the reality that American and European political strategy dating back to the early 1990s of integrating Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community and thus encouraging democratic develop­ment has largely failed. By 2009, Vladimir Putin’s policies have systemati­cally closed off nearly all legitimate structures for voicing opposition. Many nongovernmental organizations are under daily pressure from the authorities.15 The parliament is dominated by a government-run party, United Russia, and outcomes of local and national elections are controlled by the authorities. The government controls national television. The few critically minded journalists that exist routinely are threatened or are under constant surveillance by the authorities, and twenty murders of journalists since 2000 have gone unsolved.16 One small newspaper known for its criticism of Kremlin policies has seen four of its journalists killed in recent years. At a minimum, the authorities have pre­sided over an era of impunity, and at worst, some fear government authorities may have been directly involved in these deaths.17 Meanwhile, the democratic political opposition is extremely marginal and dysfunctional—irrespective of whatever government pressures are brought to bear on it. Russia has no leading liberal figures that might emerge as national leaders at present. In years past, the fighting among liberal parties was legend­ary, and led to multiple fratricidal losses in single-mandate districts, as liberal parties ran against one another—back when there were competitive elections for parliamentary seats.18 Today, it is unclear when or how the democratic opposition will repair itself. Yet, as political space has shrunk steadily in the past ten years, the major­ity of Russians do not appear to mind. In terms of the younger generation, the conventional wisdom that wealth would lead to a demand for democracy has not been borne out; only about 10 percent of survey respondents could be considered strongly supportive of democracy, while most are ambivalent. In the early 1990s, many in the West assumed that the older Soviet generation would be replaced eventually by a younger, pro-Western, pro-democratic gen­eration. Experts and policymakers alike assumed this succession would be a natural course of events, like gravity. A similar conventional wisdom about the younger generation in Russia continues. It holds that iPods, lattes, skateboards, and other artifacts of Western consumer culture will translate into a desire for independent media, justice, and human rights. In 2005 and 2007, in an environment of steadily shrinking political space, a study based at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) explored how young Russians viewed Soviet history and Stalin. Our nationally representative surveys of 16-to-29-year-old Russians suggested that, despite economic prosperity, most young people gravitated enthusiastically to Vladimir Putin’s ideological platform of revisionist history and nostalgia. The narrative advanced by the government concerning recent history quite simply resonated with this younger generation. In both surveys, a majority believed that Stalin did more good than bad and that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. These findings undoubtedly reflected coordinated strategic communications efforts by government authorities, including sup­port of a teacher’s guide rewriting Soviet history, downplaying the deaths of millions of citizens, and effacing historical memory. These actions facilitated Russia’s authoritarian trend.19 In sum, the Russian middle class and support for authoritarian governance coexist. The tacit bargain of the past decade, however, in which dissenters were punished but Russians’ pocketbooks grew, may now be threatened by the inter­national economic crisis. Oil prices plunged from a high of $147 a barrel in July 2008 to about $40 a barrel in December 2008. If the price of oil stays low, the lubricating effect of oil and gas revenues may well dry up, laying bare Russia’s dysfunctional state institutions and challenging the authorities’ ability to govern. Economic hardship and poor governance seem, at least anecdotally, to correlate with an increase in public protest and nervousness on the part of the ruling authorities.20 Perhaps, in the long run, the mix of economic hard times and poor governance will stimulate a greater demand for democracy and the rule of law in Russia, as citizens grow unhappy with state institutions that do not function and link that dysfunction to poor governance. In the near term, we can expect growth in nationalism and xenophobia. 21 To be sure, the democracy and rule of law deficit and the growth in nationalism pose problems primarily for Russians. In the twenty-first cen­tury, independent investigative journalism and the legitimate use of courts for prosecution are necessary to fight corruption. Today, Russia is plagued by corruption, and the Russian authorities dominate both television and court decisions.22 Independent newspapers and Internet sites exist, but journal­ists who have engaged in investigative journalism have been killed or live under threat.23 In a state where the rule of man predominates, the population experiences the police as predatory rather than protective. Torture in police stations is said to be common and police officers who have been rotated through Chechnya are said to be especially abusive.24 In a 2004 CSIS survey of 2,400 Russians ages 16 to 65, 41 percent of respondents feared arbitrary arrest by the police.25 In a 2007 CSIS survey of 2,000 Russians ages 16 to 29, 62 percent of respondents fully or partially distrusted the police.26 While one cannot make direct comparisons for methodological reasons, it is worth bearing in mind a recent study of attitudes toward police in China, where only 25 percent reported distrust.27 Undoubtedly, the democracy and rule of law deficit varies regionally, but it is particularly worrisome in the southern regions of Russia. The govern­ment’s approach to what it perceives as widespread radical Islamic sentiment in the North Caucasus has increased violence rather than contained it. Between May 1 and August 31, 2008, there were at least 282 incidents, and between September 1 and December 31, 2008 there were at least 333.28 When the situ­ation is at its most dire, the Russian government appears not to control this part of its territory. Many experts worry that there will be war in the North Caucasus in 2009, or possibly that, south of the border, a Russian-Georgia war will break out again.29 That prognosis may be overly gloomy, but violence is clearly on the rise and the socioeconomic conditions in the region are dire. Why It Matters What does any of this have to do with the Obama administration? The democ­racy and rule of law deficit in Russia has a range of security and human rights implications for the United States and our allies in Europe. For example, the Obama administration comes to office with a number of arms control goals. These plans may be complicated by the absence of Russian military reform that, in turn, correlates with abuse inside the army. (They are also complicated by continued government reliance on nonconventional forces: in September 2008, President Medvedev committed to modernizing the nuclear arsenal.30) Serious, joint counterterrorism efforts with the United States, Europe, and Russia are likely to remain illusive as long as the police and security ser­vices are corrupt and abusive, and the media, a potential source to expose that corruption, is largely controlled by the government. Even at the nongov­ernmental, track-two level, it is now difficult to have the sort of transatlantic Sarah E. Mendelson 11 policy dialogue on terrorism that has been common among other nations and societies since 2001.31 The most dire evidence suggests that security service personnel or contractors have been deployed abroad, in European cities, to eliminate Kremlin enemies. In the most famous example, British authorities have sought the extradition from Moscow of former KGB bodyguard and cur­rent Duma member Andrew Lugovoi for the murder by Polonium poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006.32 Kremlin proxies, such as Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, may have agents doing the same on his behalf on the streets of Austria, also with apparent impunity.33 At a minimum, the Russian authorities seem to have drawn a red line at additional enlargement of Euro-Atlantic organizations. Instead of allowing states and societies to decide for themselves what alliances and security or economic arrangements they want, Russian officials speak of “zones of inter­est” and “neutral” spaces—presumably such as Ukraine. In the worst case scenario, the Kremlin might decide to probe the resolve of existing NATO and EU security commitments. Presumably, this realization led General James Craddock to request that NATO begin defense planning for the Baltic states.34 Some believe, although the evidence is not clear, that the May 2007 cyber attack on Estonian government agencies, banks, newspapers, and other organi­zations was a first probe by the Russian government.35 In the August 2008 war in Georgia, for which all sides deserve some blame, experts saw evidence of additional Russian government cyber attacks and a prime example of blatant disregard for international law as the Russian government sought to change an internationally recognized border by force.36 Meanwhile, existing Euro-Atlantic organizations are negatively and directly affected by Russia’s democracy and rule of law deficit. In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights has heard far more cases from Russia than any other country, effectively substituting for Russia’s domestic judiciary. Some European human rights lawyers argue that this situation is severely undermining the court’s efficacy and ability to handle cases from a broad range of countries. Moreover, the Russian government increasingly has failed to compensate victims or their families, apparently now risking its expul­sion from the Council of Europe.37 According to numerous OSCE officials, the Kremlin has waged a systematic campaign to undercut the organization’s vari­ous monitoring efforts.38 The emergent norm of international election observa­tion has been undermined by the Kremlin’s attempts to legitimize fraudulent elections at home and in neighboring states, supporting a wave of authoritarian governments in this region.39

#### Global war

Goodby 2 (James E., Former Fellow – US Institute of Peace, and Piet Buwalda and Dmitriĭ Trenin, A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community, p. 27-29)

A decade after the Cold War was solemnly buried, there is still no stable peace between Russia and the Western countries. Moreover, from the late 1990s the dynamic of the relationship has taken a negative direc­tion. NATO's expansion to the east, the Kosovo crisis, and the second Chechen war stand out as milestones of the gradual slide toward something alternately described as a "cold peace" and a "new cold war." Frustration is steadily building on both sides. Mutual expecta­tions have been drastically lowered. In the Western world, and in North America in particular, public expectations for Russia and its affairs have plummeted. "Russia fatigue" is widespread in Europe as well. In Russia itself, Western, especially U.S., policies are often described as being aimed at keeping Russia weak and fragmented, with a purpose of subjugating it. It would appear, then, that today is anything but a pro­pitious starting point for an effort to chart the road toward a security community centered on Europe that would include Russia. But such an effort is necessary and should not be delayed. At worst, a Russia that is not properly anchored in a common institu­tional framework with the West can turn into a loose nuclear cannon. If conflicts arise between Russia and its smaller neighbors, the West will not be able to sit them out. And a progressive alienation between Russia and the Western world would have a very negative impact on domestic developments in Russia. Now that the German problem has been solved, the Russian problem looms as potentially Europe's largest. The United States will not be able to ignore Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, and the European Union can hardly envisage a modi­cum of stability along its eastern periphery unless it finds a formula to co-opt Russia as Europe's reliable associate. RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIZATION In the decade since the demise of the Soviet Union and the commu­nist system, Russia has evolved into a genuinely pluralist society, al­though it is still a very incomplete democracy. To its credit, Russia has a constitution that proclaims separation of powers; it has a work­ing parliament, an executive president, and a nominally independent judiciary. Between 1993 and 2000, three parliamentary and two presi­dential elections were held; for the first time in Russia's long history, transfer of power at the very top occurred peacefully and in accor­dance with a democratic constitution. This is already becoming a pat­tern. Power has been decentralized vertically as well as horizontally. Power monopoly is a thing of the past. Russia's regions have started to form distinct identities. The regional governors, or presidents of re­publics, within Russia are popularly elected, as are city mayors and regional legislatures. The national economy has been largely priva­tized. The media, though not genuinely independent either of the au­thorities or of the various vested interests, are free in principle. There is a large degree of religious freedom, and ideological oppression is nonexistent. Finally, Russians are free to travel abroad. These achievements are significant, and most of them are irre­versible. Yet, Russia's development is handicapped by major hurdles to speedier societal transformation, as is occurring in Poland or Es­tonia. One hurdle is poor governance, stemming from the irresponsi­bility of the elites as much as from sheer incompetence. Toward the end of the Yeltsin era, the state itself appeared privatized, with parts of it serving the interests of various groups or strongmen. Corruption and crime are pervasive. Accustomed to living in an authoritarian state, many Russians began to associate democracy with chaos and thug­gery. Another major problem is widespread poverty and the collapse of the social infrastructure, including health care. Too many Russians believe they have gained little or nothing from the economic and social changes of the past decade. Taken together, these factors work toward the restoration of some form of authoritarian and paternalistic rule.

### 2ac la deficit

#### Doesn’t solve Latin America partnerships- only the aff gets latin American countries on board, forming voting blocs in international institutions- can’t solve otherwise because other countries will shut us out- that’s White and Sabatini

### 2ac cir

#### Won’t pass and will be piecemeal- takes out the internal link

**Gomez, 10/17/13** (Alan, USA Today, “Shutdown over, Democrats say immigration is next”

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/17/government-shutdown-shift-immigration-reform/3000575/>

WASHINGTON — Before the bill to end the budget impasse even hit President Obama's desk Wednesday, he and congressional Democrats had pivoted to what they hope is the next big legislative battle: an overhaul of the nation's immigration laws including citizenship for the nation's 12 million undocumented immigrants.

"I look forward to the next venture, which is making sure we do immigration reform," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., said late Wednesday.

"Good luck," said Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., who chairs the House immigration committee.

House Republicans emerged from the 16-day shutdown fight angered at the White House and Reid for refusing to negotiate over the terms to end the shutdown and lift the nation's debt ceiling, and emboldened to wage more strategic legislative strikes in the future.

Gowdy has been moderately supportive of immigration changes and says he maintains good relationships with House Democrats. "But it's a little disingenuous to treat the House as an irrelevant branch of government and then say, 'By the way, tomorrow you'll need to go ahead and push (immigration reform),'" Gowdy said. "It doesn't work that way."

Democrats are hopeful that Republicans, mindful of the party's poor standing nationally with Hispanics, will support a comprehensive approach. Obama said Thursday that immigration is one of the three agenda items he wants Congress to pass this year. Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., told MSNBC Thursday that an immigration overhaul is "the thing (Obama) wants to get more than anything else" in his second term.

House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, remains publicly and privately committed to advancing immigration legislation in this Congress, but there is virtually no interest among GOP lawmakers to advance the kind of sweeping bill that Democrats are seeking. Instead, Republicans are more likely to pursue a piecemeal approach to address issues individually, such as border security and visas for high-skilled workers.

Rep. Raul Labrador, R-Idaho, a Tea Party conservative who was once a member of a bipartisan House group that tried to draft a broad immigration bill, said the prospects for even smaller bills are slim in the House.

"It's not going to happen this year," Labrador said. "After the way the president acted over the last two or three weeks where he would refuse to talk to the speaker of the House ... they're not going to get immigration reform. That's done."

Getting immigration changes through the House was always going to be a difficult task. The majority of House Republicans have consistently opposed the bill passed by the Senate in July that allows the nation's undocumented immigrants to apply for U.S. citizenship after 13 years, something many in the conference refer to as "amnesty."

That means Boehner, who struggled to unify his members throughout the shutdown, would have to "divide the conference" to pass an immigration bill, said Rep. Tim Huelskamp, R-Kan.

"That would really melt down the conference," said Huelskamp, a Tea Party conservative.

#### Don’t evaluate the disad- it’s not an opportunity cost

#### Obama doesn’t push the plan

**Fiedler, 13–** WLS web writer (Christine, “Bobby Rush pushes for better trade relations with Cuba”, <http://www.wlsam.com/common/page.php?pt=Bobby+Rush+pushes+for+better+trade+relations+with+Cuba&id=37263&is_corp=0>, NG)

Congressman Bobby Rush is trying to lift trade restrictions on Cuba. He reintroduced legislation to lift the embargo, travel, and parcel restrictions, normalize trade relations, and it would take Cuba off of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Rush says the U.S. has "shut the door on our two nations coming together to work to build a strong alliance" and that "Cuba is no longer a threat" to the U.S.

His bill also asks for the release of Alan Phillip Gross. Gross was working as a U.S. government contractor when he was arrested and prosecuted in 2011 for bringing phones and computer equipment to Cuba's Jewish community without a permit. He is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence in Cuba.

Improving U.S.-Cuba relations has been a goal of Rush; this follows his United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act in 2009.

#### Fiat solves the link

#### **Plan popular – oil lobby**

Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW

ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. 35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes.3126 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. 37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply."38

This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. 41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." 42

THE BP DISASTER ADDS TO CONCERNS Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing environmental concerns about Cuba's drilling plans.43 These concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP") historically tragic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United States and Cuba to deal with oil spills. 45 The embargo would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid any cleanup efforts. 46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies designed to prevent or contain oil spills from being sold to Cuba.47 David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington Ocean Foundation punctuated the United States' concerns over the potential impacts of Cuba's drilling by remarking that "the Gulf isn't going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil spills." 48 This statement was recently exemplified by Cuba's own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach its shores. 49 The Deep Horizon oil spill's threat was enough that several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba's own plan to extract oil off its shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba's oil exploration plans seem unfazed.5'

#### Voting neg triggers the link- the round is a debate in congress

#### PC fails and not top of the docket

**Nakamura, 10/17/13** (David, Washington Post, “Democrats renew push for immigration bill” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-renew-push-for-immigration-bill/2013/10/17/1d5e6afe-374a-11e3-ae46-e4248e75c8ea_story.html>)

But it’s not clear that GOP lawmakers, who took the brunt of public blame for the 16-day shutdown, will be forced to the negotiating table. Some key Republicans said this week that Obama’s hard-line position during the fiscal talks, in which he refused to negotiate, had further damaged his credibility with a caucus already skeptical of his agenda.

Rep. Raul R. Labrador (R-Idaho) told a conservative audience on Wednesday that “it would be crazy for the House Republican leadership to enter into negotiations with him on immigration.”

Labrador, who dropped out of a bipartisan House effort last spring to strike a comprehensive immigration deal, added: “Anything we negotiate right now with the president on immigration will be with that same goal in mind, which is to destroy the Republican Party.”

House GOP leaders remained largely silent on the issue Thursday. A spokesman for Speaker John A. Boehner (Ohio) said he “remains committed to a common-sense, step-by-step approach that ensures we get immigration reform done right.”

Boehner has said the House will not support a bipartisan plan approved by the Senate in June that features a 13-year path to citizenship for the nation’s 12 million undocumented immigrants. Instead, House leadership has said it is pursuing a series of smaller-scale bills, a tactic that immigration advocates view as a cloaked attempt to kill any momentum for a deal.

One key question is how the fiscal standoff and its aftermath might effect Boehner’s approach to immigration.

On one hand, immigration advocates said, Boehner has appeared to emerge with more respect from the conservative bloc of the GOP caucus long skeptical of his willingness to take on the White House. That could embolden him to push for a broader set of immigration proposals that could result in a conference with the Senate.

On the other hand, Boehner was forced to bring a short-term spending plan to the House floor late Wednesday that was approved with mostly Democratic support, a move the speaker acknowledged was a political loss for his party. That could make him fearful of pursuing a vote on an immigration plan that would also likely depend heavily on Democrats.

“Have the hard-liners been empowered or is the leadership getting tired of their reign?” said Tamar Jacoby, the chief executive of Immigration Works, which advocates for immigration reform on behalf of small businesses. “Does the leadership feel they have new room to maneuver or not? I don’t think anyone knows how that dynamic has been shaken up.”

#### Winners win – the plan

**Milbank, 10/18/13** – Washington Post Opinion Writer (Dana, “Now, lead from the front” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-now-lead-from-the-front/2013/10/18/56c1fd42-37fe-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html>)

Obama got out in front of the shutdown and debt-ceiling standoff. He took a firm position — no negotiating — and he made his case to the country vigorously and repeatedly. Republicans miscalculated, assuming he would again give in. The result was the sort of decisive victory rarely seen in Washington skirmishes.

On Wednesday, Republicans surrendered. They opened the government and extended the debt limit with virtually no conditions. On Thursday, Obama rubbed their noses in it.

“You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position. Go out there and win an election,” Obama taunted from the State Dining Room. “Push to change it, but don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building.”

Obama said “there are no winners” after the two-week standoff, but his opponents, particularly his tea party foes, clearly lost the most; seven in 10 Americans thought Republicans put party ahead of country. These “extremes” who “don’t like the word ‘compromise’ ” were the obvious target of Obama’s demand that we all “stop focusing on the lobbyists and the bloggers and the talking heads on radio and the professional activists who profit from conflict.” (He did not mention newspaper columnists, so you are free to continue reading.)

The gloating was a bit unseemly, but the president is entitled to savor a victory lap. The more important thing is that Obama now maintain the forceful leadership that won him the budget and debt fights. In that sense, the rest of Obama’s speech had some worrisome indications that he was returning to his familiar position in the rear.

The agreement ending the shutdown requires Congress to come up with a budget by Dec. 13 . It’s a chance — perhaps Obama’s last chance — to tackle big issues such as tax reform and restructuring Medicare. The relative strength he gained over congressional Republicans during the shutdown left him in a dominant negotiating position. If he doesn’t use his power now to push through more of his agenda, he’ll lose his advantage. George W. Bush adviser Karl Rove called it the “perishability” of political capital.

But instead of being forceful, Obama was vague. He spoke abstractly about “the long-term obligations that we have around things like Medicare and Social Security.” He was similarly elliptical in saying he wants “a budget that cuts out the things that we don’t need, closes corporate tax loopholes that don’t help create jobs, and frees up resources for the things that do help us grow, like education and infrastructure and research.”

Laudable ideas all — but timidity and ambiguity in the past have not worked for Obama. The way to break down a wall of Republican opposition is to do what he did the past two weeks: stake out a clear position and stick to it. A plan for a tax-code overhaul? A Democratic solution to Medicare’s woes? As in the budget and debt fights, the policy is less important than the president’s ability to frame a simple message and repeat it with mind-numbing regularity.

If there’s going to be a big budget deal, the president eventually will have to compromise, perhaps even allowing some changes to his beloved Obamacare, which he didn’t mention while on his victory lap Thursday. Even then, forceful leadership may not be enough to prevail.

But he has a much better chance if he remains out in front. Otherwise, he’ll soon be knocked back on his behind.

### at: cyberterror

#### Immigrants don’t solve

by Lindsey Robbins 11 "Government clearance a roadblock for tech graduates" Feb 11 www.gazette.net/stories/02112011/businew194439\_32536.php

As more cybersecurity companies seek to partner with colleges and universities to tap their graduates for their work forces, some officials worry the graduates may be unable to obtain the federal security clearance they need to be hired.¶ Although most students graduating with bachelor's degrees in the science, technology, engineering and math fields involved in cybersecurity are U.S. citizens who are easily eligible for clearance, the percentage of foreign students increases with each degree level, said Patrick O'Shea, co-director of the University of Maryland's cybersecurity center in College Park. Foreign students here on visas make up one-third of master's graduates in these fields and more than half of the Ph.D. graduates, he said.¶ It's a nationwide phenomenon, O'Shea said.¶ "It's very expensive to get them through the immigration process," said Linda Hartwig, a spokeswoman for Arinc in Annapolis. "Most of them are not candidates we would even consider."

#### No retaliation and airgapping checks

**Bailey 11 –** [Ronald is Reason's science correspondent. “Cyberwar Is Harder Than It Looks: Internet vulnerability to attacks exaggerated, says new report.” 1/18/2011, <http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/18/cyberwar-is-harder-than-it>]

Brown and Sommer conclude, “It is **unlikely** that there will ever be a true cyberwar.” By cyberwar, they mean one fought solely over and with information technologies. Why? Because it takes a lot of effort to figure out new vulnerabilities in already protected critical systems and the effects of an attack are difficult to predict, including blowback on the perpetrators. More importantly, they note, “There is no strategic reason why an aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.” In a real war, cyberattacks would be an adjunct to conventional efforts to blow up critical infrastructure. Because attacks can be launched from any set of computers, attackers can remain hidden. Consequently, a strategy of deterrence will not work in cyberwarfare because the target for retaliation is unknown. This means that **resilience** is the **main defense** against cyberweapons, a combination of preventive measures and contingency plans for a quick post-attack recovery. If cyberwarfare against infrastructure was easy, terrorists like Al Qaeda would have already tried the tactic against us and our NATO allies. Brown and Sommer observe that the Internet and the physical telecommunications infrastructure were designed to be robust and self-healing, so that failures in one part are routed around. “You have to be cautious when hearing from people engaging in fear-mongering about huge blackouts and collapses of critical infrastructures via the Internet,” says University of Toronto cyberwarfare expert Ronald Deibert in the January/February 2011 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “There is a lot of **redundancy** in the networks; it’s not a simple thing to turn off the power grid.” In addition, our experience with current forms of malware is somewhat reassuring. Responses to new malware have generally been found and made available within days and few denial of service attacks have lasted more than a day. In addition, many critical networks such as those carrying financial transactions are not connected to the Internet requiring insider information to make them vulnerable. While not everyone uses up-to-date malware detection, most government agencies, major businesses, and many individuals do, which means that would-be attackers must take the time and effort to find new flaws and develop new techniques. For example, the success of the Stuxnet worm that attacked and disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges required very extensive intelligence gathering and knowledge of specific software flaws as well as someone able to walk into the facilities with an infected USB drive. Brown and Sommers urge governments to ratify the CyberCrime Convention. The chief treaty holdouts are Russia and China, countries from which many recent cyberattacks appear to have originated. “We should not forget that many of the countries that are havens for cybercrime have invested billions in domestic communications monitoring to supplement an already extensive set of police tools for political control,” notes James Lewis. “The notion that a cybercriminal in one of these countries operates without the knowledge and thus tacit consent of the government is difficult to accept. A hacker who turned his sights from Tallinn to the Kremlin would have only hours before his service were cut off, his door was smashed down and his computer confiscated.” Another fruitful way to address emerging cyber threats suggested by the authors is to strengthen connections between national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERT experts operate as a kind of early warning system who also devise software fixes to stop the spread of new malware. And they think that public policy, including procurement, can be used to encourage the development of properly tested hardware and software. While blowing up the Internet probably won't happen, espionage, hacking, and malware will be with us always. Whatever we do to defend against them, will also defend against the threat of cyberwarfare

#### Their authors are epistemologically biased and construct threats

Brito and Watkins 11 – Jerry is a Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Tate is a Research Associate at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. (“Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy”, April 26, 2011, <http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/110421-cybersecurity.pdf>)

Over the past two years there has been a steady drumbeat of alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington about potential catastrophic cyber threats. For example, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last year, Chairman Carl Levin said that “cyberweapons and cyberattacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.”1 Proposed responses include increased federal spending on cybersecurity and the regulation of private network security practices. The rhetoric of “cyber doom”2 employed by proponents of increased federal intervention, however, lacks clear evidence of a serious threat that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a cyber-industrial complex is emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This complex may serve to not only supply cybersecurity solutions to the federal government, but to drum up demand for them as well. Part I of this article draws a parallel between today’s cybersecurity debate and the run-up to the Iraq War and looks at how an inflated public conception of the threat we face may lead to unnecessary regulation of the Internet. Part II draws a parallel between the emerging cybersecurity establishment and the military-industrial complex of the Cold War and looks at how unwarranted external influence can lead to unnecessary federal spending. Finally, Part III surveys several federal cybersecurity proposals and presents a framework for analyzing the cybersecurity threat. I.THREAT INFLATION, THE IRAQ WAR, AND PARALLELS TO THE CYBER DEBATE Threat inflation is a concept in political science that refers to “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify.”3 Different actors— including members of Congress; defense contractors; journalists; policy experts; academics; and civilian, military, and intelligence officials—will each have their own motives for contributing to threat inflation. When a threat is inflated, the marketplace of ideas on which a democracy relies to make sound judgments—in particular, the media and popular debate—can become overwhelmed by fallacious information.4 The result can be unwarranted public support for misguided policies. A. Run-Up to the Iraq War The run-up to the Iraq War illustrates the dynamic of threat inflation. After 9/11, the Bush Administration decided to invade Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein.5 Lacking any clear casus belli, the administration sought popular and congressional support for war by promoting several rationales that ultimately proved baseless.6 First, the administration implied that the Iraqi regime was connected to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.7 In a major speech outlining the Iraqi threat in October of 2002, President Bush stated that Iraq and al Qaeda had longstanding links, and that Iraq had provided training and medical treatment to members of al Qaeda.8 Vice President Cheney on various occasions made the claim that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta had met with an Iraqi official in Prague in 2001.9 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called evidence of the link “bulletproof,” and Condoleezza Rice echoed those claims.10 We now know that there was no solid evidence for those statements.11 For one thing, al Qaeda, under the direction of Osama Bin Laden, was a fundamentalist Muslim organization that despised the secular government of Saddam Hussein.12 More specifically, investigations by the FBI, CIA, and the U.N. concluded that these links did not exist.13 Mohamed Atta, for example, was in Florida at the time the alleged Prague meeting took place.14 President Bush ultimately admitted that he “had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11th,” but he did so only after the war had commenced. 15 As late as 2006, however, over 40 percent of Americans still said they believed Saddam Hussein was “personally” involved in the 9/11 attacks.16 Second, the administration also sought to make the case that Iraq threatened its neighbors and the United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By framing the issue in terms of WMD, the administration was conflating the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.17 While no doubt terrible, the destructive power of biological and chemical weapons is tiny next to that of a nuclear detonation.18 Conflating these threats, however, allowed the administration to link the unlikely but serious threat of nuclear weapons to the more likely but less serious threat posed by biological and chemical weapons.19 The president, vice president, and senior members of the administration made the claim that Iraq was close to acquiring nuclear weapons.20 They made these claims without providing any verifiable evidence. The evidence they did provide—Iraq’s alleged pursuit of uranium “yellowcake” from Niger and its purchase of aluminum tubes allegedly meant for uranium enrichment centrifuges—were ultimately determined to be unfounded.21 The administration was also aware at the time that the evidence it was presenting was problematic. The CIA had investigated the claim that Iraq had attempted to buy yellowcake in Niger and had concluded that it was false.22 Weeks before the invasion, it was revealed that the documents on which the claim had been predicated were forgeries.23 Similarly, technical experts at the Department of Energy had concluded that the aluminum tubes that had been purchased by Iraq were not suitable for uranium enrichment and were likely meant to build artillery rockets.24 Despite the lack of verifiable evidence to support the administration’s claims, the news media tended to report them unquestioned.25 The initial reporting on the aluminum tubes claim, for example, came in the form of a front page New York Times article by Judith Miller and Michael Gordon that relied entirely on anonymous administration sources.26 The article gave the impression that there was consensus that the tubes were meant for uranium enrichment.27 Later reporting by Miller and Gordon noted that, in fact, there were dissenting opinions on the purpose of the tubes among government experts.28 However, they were quick to dismiss those views, citing “other, more senior, officials” who insisted that the skeptics represented a minority view.29 One reason why the New York Times reports have been criticized so strongly is that they were later cited by the administration in making its case for war.30 Appearing on Meet the Press, Vice President Cheney answered a question about evidence of a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear program by stating: There’s a story in The New York Times this morning—this is—I don’t— and I want to attribute The Times. I don’t want to talk about, obviously, specific intelligence sources, but it’s now public that, in fact, [Saddam Hussein] has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel, the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge.31 This meant that the administration was able to cite its own leak—with the added imprimatur of the Times—as a rationale for war. Miller, who was criticized after the invasion for her credulous reporting, has defended herself by stating that as a reporter, “my job isn’t to assess the government’s information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq’s arsenal.”32 This view of reporting as mere conduit for anonymous administration officials is dangerous because it can serve to give the endorsement of an independent media on controlled leaks by government insiders.33 Most members of Congress similarly took the administration at its word and were uncritical of the evidence underpinning the rationales for war. As Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz write, A large and critical group of Democrats, whose national profiles might have bolstered the opposition to war, shied away from criticizing the popular president leading the War on Terror: while a handful jumped enthusiastically on the Iraq bandwagon, many others quietly favored invasion or at most criticized unilateral action.34 While there are competing theories why it may have been the case,35 the fact is that our system of checks and balances failed to test the evidence of a serious threat from Iraq. B. Cyber Threat Inflation Over the past two years, there has been a drive for increased federal involvement in cybersecurity. This drive is evidenced by the introduction of several comprehensive cybersecurity bills in Congress,36 the initiation of several regulatory proceedings related to cybersecurity by the Federal Communications Commission and Commerce Department,37 and increased coverage of the issue in the media.38 The official consensus seems to be that the United States is facing a grave and immediate threat that only quick federal intervention can address.39 This narrative has gone largely unchallenged by members of Congress or the press, and it has inflated the threat. There is very little verifiable evidence to substantiate the threats claimed, and the most vocal proponents of a threat engage in rhetoric that can only be characterized as alarmist. Cyber threat inflation parallels what we saw in the run-up to the Iraq War. 1. The CSIS Commission Report One of the most widely cited arguments for increased federal involvement in cybersecurity can be found in the report of the Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency.40 The Commission was convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank focused on foreign policy and defense. It was chaired by two members of Congress and composed of representatives of the IT industry, security consultants, academics, and former government officials.41 Beginning in February 2008, the Commission acted as a self-appointed transition team for whoever the next president would be. It held a series of open and closed-door meetings, received classified briefings from government officials,42 and in December issued its report warning that “cybersecurity is now a major national security problem for the United States,”43 and recommending that the federal government “regulate cyberspace.”44 In its report, the Commission makes assertions about the nature of the threat, such as, “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration that will take office in January 2009. It is . . . a battle fought mainly in the shadows. It is a battle we are losing.”45 Unfortunately, the report provides little evidence to support such assertions. There is a brief recitation of various instances of cyber-espionage conducted against government computer systems.46 However, it does not put these cases in context, nor does it explain how these particular breaches demonstrate a national security crisis, or that “we are losing.” The report notes that Department of Defense computers are “probed hundreds of thousands of times each day.”47 This is a fact that proponents of increased federal involvement in cybersecurity often cite as evidence for a looming threat.48 However, probing and scanning networks are the digital equivalent of trying doorknobs to see if they are unlocked—a maneuver available to even the most unsophisticated would-be hackers.49 The number of times a computer network is probed is not evidence of an attack or a breach, or a even of a problem.50 More ominously, the report states that Porous information systems have allowed opponents to map our vulnerabilities and plan their attacks. Depriving Americans of electricity, communications, and financial services may not be enough to provide the margin of victory in a conflict, but it could damage our ability to respond and our will to resist. We should expect that exploiting vulnerabilities in cyber infrastructure will be part of any future conflict.”51 An enemy able to take down our electric, communications, and financial networks at will could be a serious national security threat. And it may well be the case that the state of security in government and private networks is deplorable. But the CSIS report advances no reviewable evidence to substantiate this supposed threat. There is no evidence in the report that opponents have “mapped vulnerabilities” and “planned attacks.” The probing of DoD computers and the specific cases of cyber espionage that the report cites do not bear on the probability of a successful attack on the electrical grid. Nevertheless, the Commission report and the cybersecurity bills it inspired prescribe regulation of the Internet. The report asserts plainly: “It is undeniable that an appropriate level of cybersecurity cannot be achieved without regulation, as market forces alone will never provide the level of security necessary to achieve national security objectives.”52 But without any verifiable evidence of a threat, how is one to know what exactly is the “appropriate level of cybersecurity” and whether market forces are providing it? How is one to judge whether the recommendations that make up the bulk of the Commission’s report are necessary or appropriate? Although never clearly stated, the implication seems to be that the report’s authors are working from classified sources, which might explain the dearth of verifiable evidence.53 To its credit, the Commission laments what it considers the “overclassification” of information related to cybersecurity.54 But this should not serve as an excuse. If our past experience with threat inflation teaches us anything, it is that we cannot accept the word of government officials with access to classified information as the sole source of evidence for the existence or scope of a threat. The watchword is “trust but verify.” Until those who seek regulation can produce clear reviewable evidence of a threat, we should discount assertions such as “The evidence is both compelling and overwhelming,”55 and, “This is a strategic issue on par with weapons of mass destruction and global jihad.”56 2. Cyber War While the CSIS Commission report may be one of the most cited documents suggesting that we face a grave cyber threat requiring an immediate federal response, the most popular brief for this view is the 2010 bestselling book Cyber War. 57 In it, former presidential cybersecurity advisor Richard A. Clarke and Council on Foreign Relations fellow Richard K. Knake make the case that the United States and its infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to military cyber attack by enemy states. They offer a set of recommendations that includes increased regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) and electrical utilities.58 Clarke and Knake are clear about the threat they foresee. “Obviously, we have not had a full-scale cyber war yet,” they write, “but we have a good idea what it would look like if we were on the receiving end.”59 The picture they paint includes the collapse of the government’s classified and unclassified networks, refinery fires and explosions in cities across the country, the release of “lethal clouds of chlorine gas” from chemical plants, the midair collision of 737s, train derailments, the destruction of major financial computer networks, suburban gas pipeline explosions, a nationwide power blackout, and satellites in space spinning out of control.60 They explain somberly about the scene: Several thousand Americans have already died, multiples of that number are injured and trying to get to hospitals. . . . In the days ahead, cities will run out of food because of the train-system failures and the jumbling of data at trucking and distribution centers. Power will not come back up because nuclear plants have gone into secure lockdown and many conventional plants have had their generators permanently damaged. High-tension transmission lines on several key routes have caught fire and melted. Unable to get cash from ATMs or bank branches, some Americans will begin to loot stores. . . . In all the wars America has fought, no nation has ever done this kind of damage to our cities. A sophisticated cyber war attack by one of several nation-states could do that today, in fifteen minutes, without a single terrorist or soldier appearing in this country.61 According to Clarke and Knake, that is the threat we face unless the federal government takes immediate action. Readers of their bestselling book would no doubt be as frightened at the prospect of a cyber attack as they might have been at the prospect of Iraq passing nuclear weapons to al Qaeda. Yet Clarke and Knake assure us, “These are not hypotheticals.”62 Unfortunately, they present little, if any, evidence.63 The only verifiable evidence they present to support the possibility of a cyber doomsday relates to several well-known distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. A DDOS attack works by flooding a server on the Internet with more requests that it can handle, thereby causing it to malfunction. For example, the web server that hosts www.gmu.edu has a certain limited bandwidth and processing capacity with which to serve George Mason University’s home page to visitors.64 If several dozen persons were browsing university web pages and simultaneously requested GMU’s homepage, the server would likely perform perfectly well. However, if the server encountered a hundred thousand requests for the home page every second, it would be overwhelmed and would likely shut down. A person carrying out a DDOS attack will almost certainly employ a botnet to cause the massive flood of requests on the attacked server. A botnet is a network of computers that have been compromised without their users’ knowledge, usually through a computer virus.65 The attacker remotely controls these computers and commands them to carry out the attack.66 Experts have estimated that over 25 percent of personal computers are compromised and form part of a botnet.67 Clarke and Knake point to several well-known DDOS attacks as evidence of a threat. Specifically, they cite attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, both suspected by many to have been coordinated by Russia.68 They also mention an attack on U.S. and NATO websites after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,69 and a July 4, 2009 attack on U.S. and South Korean websites widely attributed to North Korea.70 These reputedly state-sponsored attacks, along with the hundreds of thousands of other DDOS attacks by criminals and vandals seen each year,71 are evidence of the sorry state of consumer computer security and of how vulnerable publicly accessible servers can be. They are not, however, evidence of the type of capability necessary to derail trains, release chlorine gas, or bring down the power grid. The authors admit that a DDOS attack is often little more than a nuisance.72 The 1999 attack saw websites temporarily taken down or defaced, but “did little damage to U.S. military or government operations.”73 Similarly, the 2009 attacks against the United States and South Korea caused several government agency websites, as well as the websites of NASDAQ, NYSE, and the Washington Post to be intermittently inaccessible for a few hours, but did not threaten the integrity of those institutions.74 In fact, Clarke points out that the White House’s servers were able to easily deflect the attack thanks to the simple technique of “edge caching,” which he had arranged as cybersecurity coordinator.75 Without any formal regulation mandating that it be done, the affected agencies and businesses worked with Internet service providers to filter out the attacks.76 Once the attackers realized they were no longer having an effect, the attacks stopped.77 Georgia similarly addressed attacks on its websites by moving them to more resilient servers hosted outside of the country.78 Clarke and Knake recognize that DDOS is an unsophisticated and “primitive” form of attack that would not pose a major threat to national security.79 Nevertheless, reference to DDOS attacks make up the bulk of the verifiable evidence they present. They assert, however, that the reason we have no verifiable evidence of a greater threat is that “attackers did not want to reveal their more sophisticated capabilities, yet.”80 Specifically referring to the Georgian and Estonian episodes, they write that “[t]he Russians are probably saving their best cyber weapons for when they really need them, in a conflict in which NATO and the United States are involved.”81 The implication is eerily reminiscent of the suggestion before the invasion of Iraq that although we lacked the type of evidence of WMD that might lead us to action, we would not want “the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”82 Clarke and Knake have no proof to corroborate the type of vulnerabilities that could pose a serious national security risk. For example, one of the threats they identify as most serious is a sustained nationwide power outage.83 The evidence they offer is either not reviewable or easily debunked. To show that the electrical grid is vulnerable, they suggest that the Northeast power blackout of 2003 was caused in part by the “Slammer” worm, which had been spreading across the Internet around that time.84 However, the final report of the joint U.S.–Canadian task force that investigated the blackout explained clearly in 2004 that no virus, worm, or other malicious software contributed to the power failure.85 Clarke and Knake also point to a 2007 blackout in Brazil, which they believe was the result of criminal hacking of the power system.86 However, separate investigations by the utility company involved, Brazil’s independent systems operator, and the energy regulator all concluded that the power failure was the result of soot and dust deposits on high voltage insulators on transmission lines.87 Given the weakness of the public evidence they offer, it is difficult to trust the evidence Clarke and Knake present based on anonymous sources. Specifically, they write that countries such as China have “laced U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs.”88 That is, that hackers have penetrated into the control systems of utilities, including the electrical grid, and left behind computer programs that can later be triggered remotely to cause damage.89 Depending on the scope of the intrusions and which systems are compromised, this could pose a serious threat. However, Clarke and Knake present only suppositions, not evidence. We are told that “America’s national security agencies are now getting worried about logic bombs, since they seem to have found them all over our electric grid,”90 and that “[enemies] have probably done everything short of a few keystrokes of what they would do in real cyber war.”91 This is speculation. The notion that our power grid, air traffic control system, and financial networks are rigged to blow at the press of a button would be terrifying if it were true. But fear should not be a basis for public policy making. We learned after the invasion of Iraq to be wary of conflated threats and flimsy evidence. If we are to pursue the type of regulation of Internet service providers and utilities that Clarke and Knake advocate, we should demand more precise evidence of the threat against which we intend to guard, and of the probability that such a threat can be realized. Clarke and Knake lament their position when they write, “How do you convince someone that they have a problem when there is no evidence you can give them?”92 Like the CSIS Commission, they recognize that there is insufficient public debate because much of the information about the state of cybersecurity is classified.93 Citizens should trust but verify, and that will require declassification and a more candid, on-the-record discussion of the threat by government officials. 3. The Media and Other Experts Much as in the run-up to the Iraq War, some in the media may be contributing to threat inflation by reporting the alarmist view of a possible threat in a generally uncritical fashion. For example, while Clarke and Knake’s Cyber War has been widely criticized in the security trade press,94 the popular media took the book at its word. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Mort Zuckerman warned that enemy hackers could easily “spill oil, vent gas, blow up generators, derail trains, crash airplanes, cause missiles to detonate, and wipe out reams of financial and supply-chain data.”95 The sole source for his column, and for his recommendation that the federal government establish a federal cybersecurity agency to regulate private networks, was Clarke’s “revealing” book.96 The New York Times’s review was also approving, sweeping aside skepticism of the book’s doomsday scenarios by noting that Clarke, who had previously warned the Bush and Clinton administrations about the threat from al Qaeda before 9/11, had been right in the past.97 The review also noted that the Wall Street Journal had recently reported that the power grid had been penetrated by Chinese and Russian hackers and laced with logic bombs, as Clarke and Knake had contended.98 That front page Wall Street Journal article from April 2009 is often cited as evidence for the proposition that the power grid is rigged to blow, but it could just as easily be cited as an example of “mere conduit” reporting.99 Similar to Judith Miller’s Iraq WMD articles, the only sources for the article’s claim that key infrastructure has been compromised are anonymous U.S. intelligence officials.100 With little specificity about the alleged infiltrations, readers are left with no way to verify the claims. The article does cite a public pronouncement by senior CIA official Tom Donahue that a cyber attack had caused a power blackout overseas.101 But Donahue’s pronouncement is what Clarke and Knake cite for their claim that cyber attacks caused a blackout in Brazil, which we now know is untrue.102 The author of the article, Siobhan Gorman, also contributed to another front-page Wall Street Journal cybersecurity scoop reporting that spies had infiltrated Pentagon computers and had stolen terabytes of data related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.103 The only sources for that report were “current and former government officials familiar with the attacks.”104 Later reporting by the Associated Press, also citing anonymous officials, found that no classified information was compromised in the breach.105 Unfortunately, without any official statement on the matter, the result of these reports can well be to raise public alarm without offering a clear sense of the scope or magnitude of the threat. The now-debunked Brazil blackout was also the subject of a CBS 60 Minutes exposé on cyber war.106 For its claim that the blackouts were the result of cyber attacks, the newsmagazine cited only anonymous “prominent intelligence sources.”107 The 60 Minutes report, however, did feature an interview with former NSA chief, now Booz Allen Hamilton vice president, Mike McConnell, who said a blackout was within reach of foreign hackers and that the United States was not prepared for such an attack.108 In February of 2010, the Washington Post granted McConnel a rare 1,400 word essay in its Sunday opinion section in which he made the cyber war case. He told readers, “If an enemy disrupted our financial and accounting transactions, our equities and bond markets or our retail commerce—or created confusion about the legitimacy of those transactions—chaos would result. Our power grids, air and ground transportation, telecommunications, and water-filtration systems are in jeopardy as well.”109 While he did not provide any specific evidence to corroborate this fear, McConnell did point to corporate espionage generally, and specifically the then-recent incident in which Google’s Gmail service had been compromised—another instance of espionage attributed to China—as evidence of a cyber threat.110 The result is more conflation of possible cyber threats. In July 2010, the cover of the Economist magazine featured a city consumed by a pixelated mushroom cloud overlaid with the words, “Cyberwar: The threat from the internet.”111 The popular conception of cyber threats fostered by the media, often relying on anonymous government sources and the pronouncements of defense contractors and consultants, can be said to be more alarming than the verifiable evidence available would suggest. And as we will see, anonymously sourced threats and expert assertions reported in the media are later cited by officials as rationales for regulation. 4. Congress Congress has also been quick to adopt the alarmist rhetoric of cyber doom espoused by the proponents of government intervention.112 For example, writing in the Wall Street Journal in support of their co-sponsored cybersecurity bill, Sens. Jay Rockefeller and Olympia Snowe warned citizens about the potential of “catastrophic economic loss and social havoc” from cyber attack.113 However, they provided no specifics of the threat and instead argued from authority that “[a]s members of both the Senate Commerce and Intelligence committees, we know our national security and our economic security is at risk.” 114 Another argument from authority is in the very first sentence of their op-ed, which quotes Mike McConnell’s oft-repeated warning, “If the nation went to war today in a cyberwar, we would lose.”115 Members of Congress have used the same rhetoric at hearings on cybersecurity. In one such hearing, Sen. Rockefeller stated, It would be very easy to make train switches so that two trains collide, affect or disrupt water and electricity, or release water from dams, where the computers are involved. How our money moves, they could stop that. Any part of the country, all of the country is vulnerable. How the Internet and telephone communication systems work, attackers could handle that rather easily.116 At another hearing, Sen. Rockefeller noted that “a major cyber attack could shut down our Nation’s most critical infrastructure: our power grid, telecommunications, financial services; you just think of it, and they can do it.”117 Sen. Snowe agreed, adding that “if we fail to take swift action, we risk a cybercalamity of epic proportions, with devastating implications for our Nation.” 118 Other members of Congress have adopted similarly alarmist rhetoric.119 Speaking at a hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin stated that “cyber weapons and cyber attacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.”120 Rep. Yvette Clarke, chairwoman of the House committee focused on cybersecurity, has said, “There is no more significant threat to our national and economic security than that which we face in cyberspace.” 121 In each of these instances, members of Congress have not offered any reviewable evidence to support their claims.